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RECENT CASES.
ACCIDENT INSURANcE-ACTION FOR DEATH OF INSURED-CONSTRUC-
TION OF POLICY-MILLER V. FIDELITY AND CASUALTY Co., 97 Fed. 836.-
A policy insured against "bodily injuries sustained through external, violent
and accidental means," but not against "injuries fatal or otherwise, result-
ing from poison or anything accidentally or otherwise taken, administered,
absorbed or inhaled * * * or any disease or bodily infirmity." Insured
took some hard pointed and resistant substances of food, and by reason of
his weakened condition they killed him. Held, that insured died from bodily
injuries, and that consequently his representatives could recover.
The present case is one that requires the application of the doctrine of
proximate and remote cause. The court has shown very acute reasoning
in applying it. The proximate cause of the internal injury is the result of
external means. It does not appear so because there is no external violence.
This is the feature of the case that makes it peculiar. Whether the violence
is external or internal is not the question. It is, rather, where did the means
by which the injury resulted originate? Following out this line of reason-
ing, it is difficult to see any distinction between a case like the present and
one where poison has been substituted for the hard substances. But the
distinction will be plainer if we give more prominence to the fact that
"bodily injury" resulted; actual, physical injury, a rupturing of the bodily
tissues.
AssIGNMENTs--FuNDs N HANDs OF ANoTHER-PARTrEs--DANvERs v.
LUGAR, 6i N. Y. Sup. 778 (App. Term).-A assigned a certain fund
to B. B assigned part of this fund to C. Held, that C might bring an action
at law to recover the amount assigned without joining his assignor, B.
A set up as a defence to C's action the fact that the assignment to C
was an assignment of a part only of an indivisable claim, and that C could
recover only in an action in equity in which the assignor, B, should be
joined. This defence was not sustained. The claim that there can be no
valid assignment of a part of an entire debt or obligation is opposed to the
well settled rule in this State. Risly v. Phenix Bank, 83 N. Y. 329, and cases
cited. But this is not the universal rule. In Mandevile v. Welch, 5 Wheat.
288, a common law action, it was said that a part only of a chose in action
could not be assigned for the reason that a creditor shall not be permitted
to split up a single cause of action into many actions without the assent of
his debtor. This case is discussed, and cases with and against it cited in
5th edition Bispham's Equity 2.&
CHARITABLE TRUST-MASSEs FOR Sour. OF TESTATOR-WEnsTnR v.
SUGHROW, 45 Atlan. 139 (N. H.).-Testator left a bequest in trust for the
saying of annual masses for himself, his deceased wife, and her deceased
sister. Held, that this was a charitable trust in so much as the officiating
priest would be performing a religious service, and that it was none the less-
so because the intercession would be specially invoked in behalf of the
testator.
In England, a bequest for such a purpose is void, as being for a super-
stitious use. In the United States, the doctrine of superstitious uses does
not obtain, but the courts differ in their opinions as to whether such a trust
will be upheld, there being no beneficiary to enforce it. 5 Am. & Eng.
Encycl. of L., 2d Ed., 927, and cases cited.
RECENT CASES.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EXTENT OF JUDICIAL PowE-INmRnEaxxa
wiTH Exncuniv PowER-LA ABRA SILVER MINING Co. v. UNITED STATES.
-Reported advance sheets decisions United States Supreme Court, Febru-
ary, igoo.-An act of Congress conferring jurisdiction upon the courts of
the United States to investigate and render a final decision as to alleged
frauds in obtaining an award of damages against the Mexican government,
rendered by a commission appointed in accordance with the terms of a
conference, is not encroaching upon the provinces of the Executive, and
therefore not in conflict with the Constitution of the United States. See
Comment.
CRIMINAL LAw-TRIAL BY JURY-DIRECTING VERDICT-PEOPLE V.
WARREN, 81 N. W. 360 (Mich.).-In a trial by jury for embezzlement, the
judge directed a verdict of guilty. The jury at first disagreed, but being se-
verely reprimanded by the court, at once returned a verdict according to the
direction. They were then polled, and eleven jurors stated that they would
have voted "Not guilty" had they not believed that in so doing they would
have been guilty of contempt of court. Held, that the judge could direct a
verdict of guilty in a criminal case, but could not compel the jury to find
accordingly.
In People v. Neumann, 85 Mich. 98, the court declares this to be the rule
in Michigan, but says that it differs from that in most of the States, which
is, that in a criminal case the court may not direct a verdict of guilty. The
reason for the general rule, given in U. S. v. Taylor, II Fed. Rep. 47o, is
as follows: "A verdict of acquittal can not be set aside, and therefore if
the court can direct a verdict of guilty, it can do indirectly that which it has
no power to do directly." With the exception of U. S. v. Anthony, Ii Blatch-
ford (U. S.) 2oi, we find no case outside of Michigan in conflict with this
general rule. The court says in this case that whenever the facts consti-
tuting the guilt are undisputed, it is the duty of the court to direct a verdict
of guilty.
COMMON CARRIERS-RAILROAD COMPANY-ExcLusIvE PRrviGEs TO
EXPRESSMEN-HEDDING v. GALLAGHmR, 45 Atlan. 96 (N. H.).-A railroad
company entered into a contract with the plaintiff whereby the latter was to
have the exclusive privilege of soliciting the carriage of baggage from the
former's station. This was a prayer for an injunction restraining the de-
fendant, another expressman, from soliciting patronage on the railroad'-
premises. Held, that a common carrier owes the duty to furnish to passen-
gers reasonable and equal facilities at its station and is bound to accord
equal facilities to all who come to that station for the purpose of carrying
passengers or baggage beyond its line of road.
Markham v. Brown, 8 N. H. 523, declares that the same duty exists in
the case of inn-keepers. The general rule seems to be in accordance with
these cases, but the Massachusetts court, in the case of Old Colony R. Co. v.
Tripp, 147 Mass. 35, distinguished between inn-keepers and common carriers,
and decided that a contract like the one under consideration was a reasonable
regulation. The N. H. court says in answer to this that "regulation is not
discrimination."
CORPORATIONS-FILNG AiNU AL REPORT-UPTEGROVE V. SCHWARz-
WAELDER, 61 N. Y. Sup. 623.-Held, that § 3, Chap. 688 N. Y. Laws, 1892,
requiring each corporation of a given class to file an annual report in the
county where its principal business office is located, was complied with,
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where the report was filed in the county to which the principal business
office had, in fact, been legally removed, though the certificate of incorpora-
tion still stated it to be in the county where it had originally been located.
In a dissenting opinion, People v. Barker, 87 Hun. 342; Transportation
Co. v. Scheu, i9 N. Y. 41O, and Factory v. Dolloway, 21 N. Y. 449, are cited as
being directly opposed to this decision. These cases, and many others in
New York, assert emphatically that the statement in the certificate of in-
corporation is conclusive as to the location of the principal business office.
The majority of the court, however, holds that what was said in those cases
related to the domicile of the corporation for the purpose of taxation only,
and says that, since the present action is brought under a penal statute, a
rule more favorable to the defendant applies, the change of location being
perfectly legal, and no fraud appearing.
DIAMAGES-MENTAL ANGUISH-WsTERN UNION TEL Co. v. HINES,
54 S. W. (Ky.) 627.-A telegram given to defendant for transmission,
reading: "Mother started at nine to-night," was delivered to plaintiff in
a changed-form, so that it read: "Mother died at nine to-night," Held, that
damages for $78o for mental anguish was not excessive.
- The weight of authority does not recognize mental, anguish unaccom-
panied by physical injury, as a ground of recovery, but in many of the
Southern States the courts hold that damages for mental suffering should
be allowed in just cases, though unaccompanied by physical suffering. This
rule is now firmly established in Texas, Alabama, Iowa, Indiana, North
Carolina and Tennessee.
Kentucky limits the application of the rule to the "nearest degree of
blood relationship."
DEEDS-PRESUMPTION AS TO ACCEPTANcE-PoRT JERvIS NATIONAL
BANK v. BONNELL, 6r N. Y. Sup. 52.-Where a mother, in consideration
of a debt due to her daughter, executes and records a deed to the daughter
without her knowledge, and delivers it to a third party, reserving no further
control over it, the estate passes, as the daughter's acceptance of the deed
is presumed from the fact that the conveyance is to her benefit.
The general rule is that the law presumes that a deed clearly beneficial
to the grantee is accepted by him when it is placed in the hands of some
third party for his use and benefit. Moore v. Giles, 49 Conn. 570; Cram v.
Wright, 114 N. Y. 3o7; Hedge v. Drew, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 4.
Some authorities dissent from this view, holding that evidence of ac-
ceptance or some other act equivalent to acceptance is necessary. Building
Association v. Heil, 81 Ky. 5r3; Maynard v. Maynard, 1O Mass. 456; Cf. 3,
Washburn on Real Property, bk. III c. 4. § 2 (Fifth Edition). Hopkins on
Real Property says, at p. 435, "There may be a presumption of acceptance
from the beneficial character of the instrument, but this presumption does
not obtain unless the grantee had knowledge of the existence of the deed."
Jackson v. Phipps, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 418; Younge v. Guilbeau, 3 Wall. 636;
Fisher v. Hall, 41 N. Y. 416.
FACTORS-UNAUTHORIZED SALE OF GOODS-BoNA FIDE PURCHASER-
ROMEO v. MARTuccI, 45 Atlan. z (Conn.).-The plaintiff, a wholesale grocer,
shipped goods to Ricciardelli & Bro., to be sold by them in their business
as retail grocers, an accounting to be made by them for the proceeds of
such sales; the title to said goods to remain in the plaintiff until the same
were sold. The defendant bought out the business and stock of R. &
Bro. in good faith. Held, in an. action of replevin to recover possession
of plaintiff's goods, that the relation between the plaintiff and R. & Bro.
is that of principal and factor; that the consignee having transferred the
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property out of his usual course of business, the consignor is entitled to
retake the property even from a bona fide purchaser for value; that the
consignor is not estopped from setting up his title inasmuch as he has done
nothing inconsistent with the real transaction between himself and his
factor. Andrews, C. J., and Hail, J., dissented.
The general rule is that where the goods are to be sold by the party
receiving them on his own account, the owner merely reserving title until
the purchase money is paid, the transaction is a conditional sale and not a
consignment, and hence under statute in most States is an absolute sale
as to third parties unless recorded. But it has also been held that a pur-
chaser of the entire stock will not be so protected, nor will a purchaser not
in the regular course of trade. Burbank v. Crooker, 7 Gray 158; Pratt v.
Burhans, 84 Mich. 489.
. INjUNcTioN-GRouNDs-THREATENNG SUITS FOR INFR.NGEMENT OF
PATENTS-ADRIANCE, PLATT & Co. v. NATIONAL HARROW Co., 98 Fed. i18.
-An owner of a patent published letters and circulars asserting the validity
of his patent, that another manufacturer infringed it, and that any one who
purchased the infringing article would be sued by the owner of the patent.
Held, that a bill asking for an injunction against such circulars cannot be
dismissed on demurrer.
This decision recognizes that equity may have jurisdiction to enjoin a
party from advertising his goods. It all depends upon whether the adver-
tisement uses false, malicious, offensive or opprobrious language, with the
purpose of injuring the party claimed to be infringing. Kelly v. Ypsilnadi
Dress-Stay Manuf. Co., 44 Fed. 19. In view of the undoubted right every
one has to advertise his goods so long as he does it in good faith, and of the
adequate remedy at law which the plaintiff may claim, if in such advertise-
ment anything libelous has been published, courts are bound to consider
such questions as this with great care. There is little law as yet on this
subject, but since the case of Kidd v. Horry, 28 Fed. 773, courts seem in-
clined to recognize the jurisdiction of equity in cases where a malicious
motive and bad faith are clear.
INN-K PERs--LIABILTrY FOR GOODS OF GUEST-M-IscoNDucT OF GUEST
-Luc v. ORNEL, 61 N. Y. Sup. (App. Div.) 659.-The plaintiff, a guest
in a hotel, took a woman of ill-fame to his room with him for consort, who
absconded with a sum of his money. Plaintiff then requested the hotel clerk
to keep the remainder of his money for him, but the clerk refused to do so,
and after plaintiff went back to his room, the balance of his money was
stolen from him. Held, that plaintiff's misconduct and immorality did not
bar him from recovering the balance, subsequently stolen.
Curtis v. Murphy, 63 Wis. 4. holds that if a man takes a woman to a
hotel for the purpose of prostitution, he does not thereby acquire the rights
of a guest. But this does not apply in the present case, as the man was not
robbed while occupying the room with the strumpet, but afterwards.
PARTIES--ACTION BY MARRIED WOMAN-Loss OF EARNING CAPAcITY
-TExAs R. R. Co. v. HumBLE, 97 Fed. 837.-A married woman sued for
personal injury independently of her husband. Held, that she could recover
damages for the impairment of her earning capacity, and that this recovery
was one in which the husband had no interest.
The present case brings out a distinction that is a source of some con-
fusion, the difference between an impairment of a married woman's earning
capacity and her capacity to render services to her husband and family. In
the latter case the husband has the right to sue for the injury, not the woman.
R. R. Co. v. Hense,, s8 Fed. s3I. But her capacity to earn money may
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be entirely independent of the senrice she renders to her family. She may
be engaged in a separate and independent business at the same time that she
is performing her family duties. In such cases it seems that the damages
she may recover for an injury that impairs her ability to engage in such
business are personal, and that the husband has no interest in them. Tuttle
v. R. R., 42 Iowa S18; Filer v. N. Y. C. R. R., 49 N. Y. 47. The fact that in
most cases a woman's services to her family are measured by her capacity
to do labor, and the resulting difficulty experienced in separating one
from the other prevents the distinction from always being clear.
PERCOLATING WATERs--RIGHT OF CITY TO DIVERT-DAMAGES TO
OWNER OF ADJACENT LANDS-FORBELL V. CITY OF NEW YORK, 6I N. Y.
Sup. ioo.-The city, by means of an extensive system of porous under-
ground conduits connected with a powerful pumping station collected the
percolating waters of an area of several square miles. This land was bought
by the city and used for this purpose only, and no improvement was made
upon it, nor was any intended. The direct result was to lower the water
level of the plaintiff's and other lands, and destroy the crops growing, or
which might have been grown upon them. Held, the city was liable for the
damages thus sustained.
The case is an extension of the doctrine laid down in Smith v. The City
of Brooklyn, 54 N. E. 787; 9 Yale Law Journal 94. The facts are the same,
but here the plaintiff is allowed to recover, not for the loss of the enjoyment
of a running stream fed by these percolations, but directly for the loss of the
percolating waters resulting in the failure of his crops. There his rights as
riparian owner were involved, here only his rights as proprietor of the land.
On principle the case is directly contrary to Chaseman v. Richards, 7 H. I
349, and Bradford v. Pickles, I895 App. Cases 587, though the facts were not
so strong in the English cases.
RAILROADS-INJURY AT CROSSING-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-GIL-
BERT V. ER= R. Co., 97 Fed. 747.-Plaintiff's deceased drove upon a rail-
road crossing in a covered buggy. At z35 feet from said crossing he saw
the approaching train, but drove upon the crossing and was killed. Held,
the rule that plaintiff's contributory negligence is counteracted by defend-
ant's knowledge of plaintiff's danger and neglect to take reasonable care to-
avoid injury to plaintiff does not apply where the negligence of plaintiff and
defendant is concurrent
As soon as contributory negligence became a common defence, limita-
tions upon the doctrine began to be developed. One of these limitations is
that which is recognized by the Supreme Court in Railway Co. v. Ives, i44
U. S. 4o8, and enunciated in Davies v. Mann, IO Mees. & W. 546, "that con-
tributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be
shown that the defendant might by the exercise of reasonable care have
avoided the consequences of injured parties' negligence." This supposes an
unequal amount of negligence on one side or the other. Where the negli-
gence of both parties is equal, the rule does not apply, and the case becomes
one governed by the usual rules in regard to contributory negligence. The
present case places a natural and necessary limitation upon Railway Co. v.
Ives.
RAILROADS-INJURY TO EMPLOYEE-POTTER V. DETROIT, G. H., & M.
Ry. Co., 81 N. W. 8o (Mich.).-A brakeman climbing upon the ladder on
the side of a moving freight car, was struck and injured by a telegraph pole
located near the track. Held, in an action to recover damages for the injury,
that, though the plaintiff had many times before passed by this pole, it was
a question for the jury as to whether he was chargeable with knowledge of
the danger.
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This decision rests upon the ground that the plaintiff, having previously
passed the pole, either on foot or on the top of a freight car, the danger of
being struck might not have been so obvious to him from such point of
view as to charge him with knowledge of it. One justice dissents, and says:
"This, and like cases that may be found in the reports, we think cannot be
sustained upon principle and leave anything of the rule of assumed risks."
Cf. Bailey, Mast. Liab., p. 8o. "When the location is ascertained the danger
is manifest; it being the law and the contract that the servant ought to
know that which was plain to be seen, and which it was a part of his duty
to learn and know."
ScHooLs-:DIsRImnNATION BETWEEN COLORED CHILDREN-RIGHTS
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION-ELIZABETH CISCO -V. SCHOOL BOARD OF THE
BOROUGH OF QUEENS, NEW YORx CiTY-Decided New York Court of
Appeals, February 6, IgOO.-Where separate schools of equal accommoda-
tions are provided for white and colored children, a refusal to grant ad-
mission to colored children to the schools maintained for white pupils does
not violate any of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution. See Comment.
ScHooLs-DIscRiMINATION AGAINST COLORED CHILDREN- RIGHTS
UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-J. W. CUMMINGS ET AL. V. COUNTY
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF RICHMOND COUNTY, STATE OF GEOxGIA.-A
temporary suspension of a high school for colored children, in order that the
funds used in its support might be diverted towards the education of children
of the same race in the -primary schools, is no ground for the granting of an
injunction restraining the Board of Education from using certain funds for
the maintenance of a high school for white children. See Comment:
STREET RAILWAYS--INJURIES TO PASSENGER-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE-WISE V. BROOKLYN HEIGHTS IL Co., 61 N. Y. Sup. 53.,-Plaintiff
alighted at night from a street car at a station in the suburbs of a city, and
on starting to cross a parallel track was struck and injured by a car running
at high speed, on a down grade, in the opposite direction. The car from
which plaintiff alighted obstructed the view of the approaching car, which
at the time was from 8oo to I2oo feet distant. Held, that the question of
his negligence should have been allowed to go to the jury, and not decided
to be contributory negligence per se by the court; first, because by reason
of the darkness and existing obscurities, plaintiff might not, in the exercise
of prudence, have determined that the car was too close to render it danger-
ous to attempt to cross the track, and, secondly, because, since a street rail-
way company is not justified in running its cars at high speed past a car
standing on a parallel track to allow passengers to alight, who might cross
to either side of the street, its act in so doing, rendering the place appointed
for passengers to alight dangerous, is an act of negligence tending to excuse-
plaintiff's failure to observe the approaching car.
To constitute contributory negligence, an act must be the proximate
cause of the injury, and also show lack of care on the plaintiff's
part. The New York rule in Lcndrigan v. R. R., 23 App. Div. 43, holds
failure to observe the approach of a car on a parallel track, under circum-
stances somewhat similar to the present case, contributory negligence per se,
but the present case is distinguished because the darkness might have made
the failure to see the car not inconsistent with the exercise of due care, and
also because, the accident having happened at a station where passengers
were being discharged, the company was guilty of negligence in not slacken-
ing the speed of the car that struck plaintiff. This may have been the proxi-
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mate cause of the accident, thus bringing it within the rule that plaintiff may
recoyer, although careless himself, if the defendant might, by the exercise
of care on his part, have avoided the consequences of plaintiffs carelessness.
Cooley on Torts, p. 812; R. 1?. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 429.
Where the facts are undisputed, and it appears that failure to "look and
listen" proximately contributed to an injury which would otherwise have
been avoided, such failure should be held contributory negligence, as a
matter of law. Schofield v. R. R., 114 U. S. 615; Tully v. Fitchburg R. R., 134
Mass. 499; Tolman v. R. R., 98 N. Y. 198; otherwise the question of failure
to use ordinary care should be left to the jury. Hanks v. Boston, etc., R. P.,
147 Mass. 495; Blaizer v. N. Y., etc., R. R., iio N. Y. 638; Wilson v. P. R. R.,
132 Pa. St. 27.
TAXATIoN-PERsONALTY-MISSOuaI, K. & T. Rv. Co. v. BoARD op
CommIssIoNERs oF LABEr Comrrv Er AL,., 59 Pac. 383 (Kan.).-Held,
under paragraph 6873 Gen. St., 1889, that the roadbed, track and right of
way of a railway is personal property, and not real property, and as such, the
tax thereon is a personal tax.
The correctness of this decision is unquestionable, as it is in accord
with the statute. However, it is of interest to note that the statute negatives
the common law rule which considers the roadbed, track and right of way
as realty, a rule which has been uniformly followed in the decisions of the
courts. That the legislature has power to say that such property shall be
considered personalty must be recognized, since it has the power to treat
the rolling stock of a railroad as realty for the purpose of taxation. Louis-
ville Ry. Co. v. State, 25 Ind. 177. Although the better authorities treat it as
personalty. Amer. and Eng. Ency. of Law, Vol. i9, page 883. The Kansas
statute, as far as we are able to learn, is without a parallel.
TELEGRAPH COMPAM-Es-STocx EXCHANGE NEws--MAR= QUOTA-
TIONS-PUBLIC IZIGHTS--IN RE RENVILLE Er AL., 6r N. Y. Sup. 549.-A
telegraph company contracted with the New York Stock Exchange, a volun-
tary association, to transmit stock-market reports to such persons as the
exchange should designate, and to refuse to transmit such information to
persons whom it might designate; the telegraph company paying the ex-
change for the news, and charging the persons so furnished thej'efor. Peti-
tioner had been furnished such news by the telegraph company prior to the
contract, when the company, under order of the exchange, refused him
further service, although it had been paid therefor in advance. Held, that
the petitioner could not compel the telegraph company to furnish him with
such news; that information as to transactions on a stock exchange, which
is a voluntary association, whose facilities are limited to its members, is not
property clothed with a public interest, so as to entitle persons not mem-
bers to compel the furnishing of such information against the wishes of the
association.
The correctness of this decision is unquestioned. It is based on sound
legal principles, and is supported by authority. Cf. Telegram Co. v. Smith,
47 Hun. 505; Wilson v. Telegram Co., 3 N. Y. Sup. 633. A different conclu-
sion was reached in the case of New York & Chicago Grain & Stock Ex-
change v. Board of Trade of City of Chicago, 127 Ill. 153, ig N. E. 855, 2 L.
R. A. 4r1. The basis of that decision was that as the board had created a
standard market in agricultural products, and built up a great system for
the communication of market fluctuations, upon which the public relied, it
could not be allowed to furnish them to some and refuse them to others.
If it gave information to one, aid the Illinois court, it had to give the same
information to all. and the court could compel it to give such information.
It would seem clear that the court has no such power. No franchise has
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been conferred upon this voluntary association by the public whch "ustiEes
an interference by the public with its method of conducting bus:nes.. The
doctrine of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, does not apply. That case decided
that the legislature could regulate the rate of charge for services rendered in
a public employment, or for use of property in which the public nad an
interest. In the present case no property of the Stock Exchange bad been
devoted to public use, and the public had no legal interest in that propert-y.
TowN OFFIcERs-AuTHORITY TO WAIVE STATUTE OF Lnmrr.r.Tio.,s-
McGARY V. CITY OF N. Y., 61 N. Y. Sup. 689.-A town board has no
authority to revive a claim against the town after it has been barred by the
Statute of Limitations. The town board is in a sense a trustee, and as such
is bound to protect the inhabitants of the town against outlawed or other
uncollectible demands. They are in the same position as executors, who
cannot waive the Statute of Limitations after it has once attached. Butler v.
1o non, III N. Y. 204; Schutz v. Morette, 146 N. Y. i37.
WRIT OF R-ESTITUTION-ExPIRATION OF LEAsE-STATE EX REL. V.
ORTH & BEwsoN, JUDGE, 59 Pac. 5oi (Wash.).-At the time of entry of
judgment directing issuance of a writ of restitution, defendant's lease had
expired. Held, that under contract pleaded by defendant that he was no
longer entitled to possession is not ground for refusing to fix the super-
sedeas bond staying issuance of writ, as 2 Ballingers Ann. St., § S546, author-
izes either party aggrieved by such a judgment to appeal, as in other civil
actions. Fullerton, J., and Dunbar, J., dissenting.
Substantially the contention made by the respondent is that no real con-
tention arises upon the appeal, that, the lease having expired, the subject-
matter of the contest has ceased to exist. This position is held by the dis-
senting judges, who rely, as the respondent, upon Hice v. Orr, 16 Wash. 163.
The court, however, held that a mandamus should issue, as it could not
inspect the record of the trial to determine the merits of the case, and that
as the pleadings disclosed a controvers, the appeal should be allowed as
provided by statute.
